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The impact of dividend policy on institutional holdings:  
hotel REITs and non-REIT hotel corporations  
 
Abstract 
 
Previous research (Canina, Advani, Greenman, & Palimeri, 2001) shows that dividend initiations 
and dividend increases result in higher stock returns. Although institutions need to hold stocks 
that pay high dividends because of the prudent-man rule, recent research (Grinstein & Michaely, 
2005) contradicts this practice. Since hotel REITs and non-REIT hotel corporations belong to the 
same industry but have different dividend policies, it is worth examining the impact of dividend 
policy on institutional holdings. We find institutions tend to prefer REITs. We also find 
institutions prefer large firms that make capital expenditures, regardless of REIT status.  
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The impact of dividend policy on institutional holdings:  
hotel REITs and non-REIT hotel corporations  
 
 
Introduction and background 
 
The purpose of this research is to assess whether or not different dividend payment policies 
between lodging real estate investment trusts (REITs) and lodging non-REIT corporations affect 
the motivations of institutional investors to hold their stock. As discussed by Beals and Arabia 
(1998) the REITs of the 1970s were primarily mortgage REITs, or those that would lend money 
to fund hotel projects. By the 1990s however, most were equity REITs that represent direct 
investment of lodging properties. This is still the most common REIT in the 21st century. 
REITs came into being by an act of Congress in 1960 as a way to encourage the 
participation of small investors in real estate. One of the unique features of a REIT was the 
requirement that it must pay 95% of its net income in the form of dividends to shareholders. If 
this and certain other requirements are met, the REIT was (and still is) allowed to deduct these 
dividends thus avoiding the double taxation curse that occurs with corporations paying 
dividends. Based on information in Kim, Mattila and Gu (2002), the law was changed in 2001 
such that REITs now only have to pay out 90% of their earnings as dividends, allowing more 
internal equity to fund future growth. 
The focus of this research is on how dividend payments by REIT versus non-REIT lodging 
companies may or may not affect the attractiveness of these companies to institutional investors.  
According to Canina, Advani, Greenman and Palimeri (2001), the average U.S. corporation has a 
dividend payout ratio of approximately 50%. On the other hand, their research indicates non-
REIT lodging firms only have a payout ratio of approximately 7%. Therefore, do institutional 
investors prefer lodging REITs that pay 90% of earnings as dividends or the stocks of non-REIT 
lodging firms that, on average, only pay 7%?  
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Comparing lodging REITs and lodging C-corporation provides an ideal setting for testing 
institutional preferences on dividend policy. Both stocks are located in the same industry but 
have different dividend policies. While a previous study (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005) did not 
find a positive relationship between dividend policy and institutional holdings, this may be due to 
an aggregated sample.  
The potential answer to this research question begins with an examination of the agency 
theory and information asymmetry literature that is presented in the next section. After reviewing 
the literature, we discuss the data used and the methodology employed. We subsequently present 
our findings and conclusions and recommendations for further research.    
 
Literature Review 
Institutions have certain reasons for preferring dividend-paying stocks. One may be that 
dividends may provide more information about a firm, reducing the agency problem of 
information asymmetry for investors. Additionally, since institutions act as fiduciaries, they are 
governed by the prudent-man rule. The prudent-man rule is designed to protect beneficiaries by 
permitting them to seek damages from a fiduciary that fails to act in the better interest. Stocks 
with more stable earnings and dividends are considered to be prudent stocks (Del Guercio, 1996). 
A similar finding by Oak and Dalbor (2008) indicates that institutions consider high-priced 
stocks to be prudent investments as well.   
The differing tax position of each institution also impacts the preference for a firm’s 
dividend. Pension funds and university endowments may prefer dividend-paying stocks because 
of the comparative tax advantage of being tax-exempt institutions. However, since other 
institutions are taxed twice (both for the corporation and for individual owners on personal 
dividend income), they may not prefer dividend-paying stocks (Tong & Ning, 2004).  
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Research indicates that institutional shareholdings are increased over the 3- to 9-month 
period following the dividend initiation (Dhaliwal, Erickson & Trezevant, 1998). However, 
previous studies found that institutional holdings are not significantly related to payout ratios or 
dividend yields in REITs and other stocks (Ciochetti, Craft, & Shilling, 2002; Gompers & 
Metrick, 2001). Grinstein and Michaely (2005) show that although institutions prefer dividend-
paying firms to non-dividend-paying firms, they are attracted to those firms that pay fewer 
dividends. Jain (2005) also reports that institutional investors prefer low dividend-yield stocks 
across all sectors. These results are contrary to the agency cost and information asymmetry 
models along with the prudent-man rule. Previous studies did not find why institutional holdings 
do not have a positive relationship with dividend payments. Since hotel REITs and non-REITs 
hotel corporations belong to the same industry, comparing these two types of lodging companies 
provides a good opportunity to investigate the impact of dividend policy on institutional 
holdings.   
There has also been research conducted as to the differential factors that may influence the 
investment behavior of institutions in REITs. Many of these factors relate to information that is 
available about the firms. Although some research indicates that institutions invest more in the 
REITs than in other matching firms (Chan, Leung & Wang, 1998), there is more than one 
possibility for this finding.  
As an example, institutions prefer REITs with larger market capitalization and equity REITs 
than mortgage and hybrid REITs (Below, Stansell & Coffin, 2000). One reason for this may be 
that REITS with larger market capitalization (a proxy for size) have more information about 
them. Moreover, REITs with more growth potential (high market-to-book ratio) and lower 
dividend yields are preferred by institutions (Below, Stansell & Coffin, 2000).  
Given the fixed asset-intensive nature of the hotel industry, growth opportunities in the 
industry are funded by capital expenditures (Dalbor and Upneja, 2004). Additionally, contrary to 
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the findings of much existing financial research regarding the relationship between growth and 
debt, Dalbor and Upneja (2004) find a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
debt for the lodging industry (non-REIT). Overall, the interest in firms with growth opportunities 
is because institutional managers are simply seeking superior returns.  
When “regular” investors consider stock returns, the dividend yield (a function of the 
dividend payout ratio) is often an important consideration in the total return of the stock. 
However, when REITs are considered, research findings show that the dividend payout ratio of 
REITs is negatively related to the return on total assets and growth rate of total assets (Wang, 
Erickson & Gau, 1993). However, they find that the dividend payout ratio of REITs is positively 
related to the debt-to-asset ratio.  
Thus, if investors prefer firms with high dividend payout ratios, they prefer firms with high 
debt ratios as well. Previous studies (Canina, Advani, Greenman & Palimeri, 2001; Wang, 
Erickson & Gau, 1993) show that dividend initiations for both C-Corp and REITs increase stock 
returns. As dividend payments increase, institutional holdings increase. As companies increase 
their dividend payments, institutional investors increase their ownership of stocks in these 
companies. Investments by pension funds and bank trusts have a strong positive relationship with 
dividend payment of both lodging REIT and non-REIT lodging stocks.   
Mooradian and Yang (2001) examine differing firm characteristics of hotel REITs and non-
REIT hotel corporations. Non-REIT hotels have a significantly larger amount of free cash flow 
than their REIT counterparts before and after dividend distribution. Firms with more free cash 
flow are more likely to have agency problems. The market-to-book value ratio is significantly 
higher for hotel REITs that retain less free cash flow. Institutions will prefer hotel REITs that 
have less free cash flow and high market-to-book ratios. 
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Hypotheses 
Based upon our review of the literature, we attempt to assess institutional holding behavior 
using the following research hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference in the number of lodging REITs versus non-REIT 
lodging stocks held by institutional investors.  
Lodging REITs with high dividend payments will have more institutional investors than regular 
lodging corporations. By rule, lodging REIT firms must pay at least 90% of their earnings as 
dividends. This high payout ratio makes them more attractive to institutions largely because of 
the prudent man rule and the increased availability of information content provided by dividend 
payments.   
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant and positive relationship between dividend payments 
and institutional investors’ ownership of both lodging REIT and non-REIT lodging stocks.  
As companies increase their dividend payments, institutional investors increase their ownership 
of stocks in these companies. Similar to research hypothesis number one above, institutions 
prefer dividend paying firms because of the prudent-man rule. As previously stated, studies by 
Canina, Advani, Greenman & Palimer (2001) and Wang, Erickson & Gau (1993) show that 
dividend initiations for both C-Corp and REITs increase stock returns. Furthermore, a study by 
Del Guercio (1996) indicates dividend-paying firms to be considered “prudent” investments. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Non-REIT hotel companies comprise 127 firms in the Compustat database with SIC code 
7011 for the years 1980 to 2004. Hotel REITs comprise 22 firms with SIC code 6798 during the 
same period. The sample of hotel REITs is obtained from NAREIT (National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts) which categorizes REITs by investment type (see Table 1).  
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**Insert Table 1 here** 
Hotel REITs are mostly equity trusts that acquire property interests. A PMC commercial 
trust is the only hybrid trust that combines an equity trust and a mortgage trust (purchasing 
mortgage obligations).  
Quarterly institutional holdings are from Thompson Financial Spectrum institutional filing 
13(f) from 1980 to 2004. Quarterly institutional ownership is categorized into 5 groups: banks, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, brokerage firms and pension funds. This study restricts the 
institutional holdings sample to lodging non-REIT corporations and lodging REIT corporations 
found in the annual Compustat files in order to match firm characteristics.  
Institutional holdings for a particular stock in the given quarter are determined by the 
percentage of institutional ownership (the share holdings of institutions divided by the total share 
outstanding for the firm). The dividend payout ratio is calculated using the annual dividends paid 
in the year divided by the book value of assets (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). 
The control variables in the regression models include size (total assets), book-to-market 
value, capital expenditures-to-asset ratio, debt, price and an excess returns variable. These 
variables are included to help alleviate confounding issues related to institutional ownership 
between REITs and non-REITS. Justification for their inclusion can be found in Oak and Dalbor 
(2008). They find that institutions prefer lodging stock of larger firms, and those with low book-
to-market value ratios. Moreover, institutions prefer firms with high capital expenditure-to-assets 
ratios, high debt ratios and high stock prices. Finally, to understand the difference of institutional 
holdings between REITs and non-REITs stocks, a dummy variable for REITs is used (1= hotel 
REIT, 0 = non-REIT hotel corporation).  
T-tests are used to measure differences in firm characteristics between non-REIT lodging 
corporations and lodging REIT corporations. Regression analysis is used to determine the 
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relationship between institutional holdings and dividend payout as measured by the dividend 
(Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). The following is the full model used for the regression analysis: 
Institutional holdings = intercept + ß1size + ß2book-to-market ratio + ß3capital expenditure-
to-assets ratio + ß4debt ratio + ß5price + ß6dividend to assets ratio + ß7dummy REITs/non REITs 
+ ß7 excess returns + error term of the regression.  
 
Results 
 ** Insert Table 2 here ** 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and results of t-tests for non-REIT and REIT firms. The 
results indicate that institutional holdings of hotel REITs are larger than non-REIT hotel firms. 
While institutional investors own, on average, 9% of lodging REIT stocks, they only own 6% of 
non-REIT lodging stocks. Hotel REITs have a higher mean dividend-to-assets ratio. This is seen 
in Table 2 where hotel REITS have a mean dividend-to-assets ratio of 4% and non-REITs have a 
dividend to assets ratio of only 2%. Because REITs maintain a policy of distributing at least 90% 
of income, hotel REITs have significantly larger dividend payout as a percentage of assets. Hotel 
REITs also have a higher average book-to-market ratio. Non-REIT hotel corporations have 
higher average size, debt ratio, capital expenditure-to-assets ratio and stock price.  
We also examined the entire sample of firms by market capitalization. We divided both the 
REIT and non-REIT samples based on the quartiles of market capitalization. As the market 
capitalization increases, institutional holdings increase as shown in Panel B of Table 2. In every 
quartile, REITs have larger institutional holdings than non-REITs. In the first quartile, REITs 
have larger institutional holdings, debt ratio and dividend-to-assets than non-REITs. However, 
non-REITs are larger, have a higher book-to-market ratio, a higher capital expenditure-to assets 
ratio and higher prices than REITs. In the second quartile, REITs have larger institutional 
holdings, a higher debt ratio and a higher dividend-to-asset ratio than non-REITs. However, 
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similar to the first quartile, non-REITs have a larger,capital expenditure-to-asset ratio, along with 
prices and excess returns.  
In the third quartile of market capitalization, REITs have larger institutional holdings and 
are larger in size. Additionally, they have a higher debt ratio, dividend-to-assets ratio and excess 
returns than non-REITs. On the other hand, non-REITs have a larger capital expenditure-to-
assets ratio and price than REITs. In the fourth quartile, REITs are significantly larger and have a 
higher debt ratio and dividend-to-assets ratio than non-REITs. On the other hand, non-REITs 
have a larger book-to-market and capital expenditure-to-asset ratio and a higher price than 
REITs.  
It should also be noted that we examined differences in institutional holdings of hotel 
corporations that pay dividends and those that do not (these results are not shown but are 
available from the authors). Our statistical comparison revealed that the holdings in the two 
groups were not significantly different. Additionally, when we compared holdings in REITs that 
have a dividend payout of 90% versus those REITs that pay more, there was a significant 
difference at alpha = .05. 54% of hotel corporations pay dividends. The amount of Hotel REITs 
that pay out more than 90% of their earnings as dividends is 72.8%. Thus, the percentage of hotel 
REITs that pay just 90% of earnings as dividends is 27.2%.  
** Insert Table 3 ** 
Table 3 shows institutional holdings by the time period and types of institutions. During the 
1990s, pension fund, mutual fund and brokerage firms increased their shares in the lodging firms. 
** Insert Table 4 ** 
Table 4 is the correlation matrix of the variables of interest. The log of institutional holdings 
has a significantly positive relationship with all of the independent variables except for two. The 
book-to-market ratio is negatively related to the log of institutional holdings and the excess 
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returns are insignificant to the log of institutional holdings. Moreover, all of the correlations are 
highly significant.  
** Insert Table 5 ** 
When all types of institutions are included in the first regression model, the REIT variable 
is positive and highly significant (model 1 in Table 5). This confirms the finding from the t tests 
that institutions prefer hotel REITs to non-REIT hotel firms. The dividend to assets ratio is not 
significant. This may be because each institution has a unique investment style and aggregate 
data may not show the institution subgroup’s characteristics. Additionally, the log of institutional 
holdings is positively related to size, capital expenditure to asset, debt ratio and price. Excess 
returns are insignificant.  
In the regression model using pension funds (model 6 in Table 5), the REIT dummy variable 
is positively related to institutional holdings. Hotel REITs have larger institutional holdings than 
non-REIT hotel companies. The dividend to assets ratio and capital expenditure-to-assets ratio 
are negatively related to institutional holdings. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that 
institutions prefer firms that pay dividends. However, among dividend paying firms they find that 
institutions prefer firms that pay fewer dividends. This may also be the case here with pension 
funds. Pension fund holdings are positively related to size, book-to-market ratio and debt ratio. 
Moreover, pension fund holdings are negatively related to capital expenditure to assets and price. 
The model indicates that the excess returns variable is insignificant.   
In the regression model that uses mutual funds (model 4 in Table 5), institutional holdings 
are positively related to REITs and the dividend to assets ratio. According to the prudent man 
rule, mutual funds prefer dividend paying firms. In addition, mutual fund holdings are positively 
related to capital expenditure to assets, debt ratio and price. Mutual fund holdings are negatively 
related to the book-to-market ratio. Similar to the finding for mutual funds, excess returns are 
insignificant for pension funds.  
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The results indicate that bank holdings are positively related to REITs (model 2 in Table 5). 
In addition, bank holdings are positively related to size, capital expenditure to assets, debt and 
price. However, the book-to-market, dividend to assets and excess returns variables are not 
significantly related to institutional holdings.  
Much like the results involving banks, the regression model involving insurance firms 
(model 3 in Table 5) indicates that their institutional holdings are positively related to REITs. 
Insurance firm holdings are positively related to size, capital expenditure to assets and the debt 
ratio. The book-to-market ratio is highly significant and negatively related to an insurance firm’s 
holdings. Price and the dividend to assets do not appear to have an impact on the investment 
decision of insurance firms. A somewhat surprising finding is that, unlike other institutions, 
excess returns are negatively significant. 
In the regression utilizing brokerage firms (model 5 in Table 5), institutional holdings are 
also positively related to REIT status. Brokerage firms prefer large firms, firms with low book-
to-market ratios, high capital expenditures, more debt and a high price. The dividend payout ratio 
is positively significant while the excess returns variable is insignificant.  
** Insert Table 6 ** 
Table 6 shows regression models for all instructions by time period. The first panel, which 
includes all years, shows that most of the variables are significant. The exceptions are the book-
to-market ratio (significant at only 10%) and dividend to assets and excess returns which are 
insignificant. 
The next panel shows the results for the early 1980s. Although the adjusted r-squared 
statistic has increased to over 19%, most of the variables are insignificant except for the debt 
ratio which is negatively significant. The next panel to the right indicates results for the rest of 
the 1980s and shows different results than the early 1980s. The adjusted r-squared statistic 
increases to 34% and now four of the seven independent variables are significant, including 
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excess returns. Perhaps the most interesting variable in this model is the debt ratio which is 
positively significant during this time period but was negatively significant during the preceding 
time period. The results may have been impacted by legislation such as the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. However, since we did not have any specific a priori expectation regarding the sign or 
significance of these variables based upon time periods, we believe these findings would be a 
fruitful topic for further research. 
The next panel to the right in the table shows results for the early 1990s. Once again, the 
majority of variables are significant, although the overall adjusted r-squared has declined. The 
dividend to asset ratio is now highly significant, but the debt ratio is now insignificant. This may 
be a result of changes in lending practices from the banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The results for the late 1990s are very similar to those of the earlier part of the decade, 
except that the price variable is insignificant for this period. The final panel showing the first five 
years of the 21st century is very similar to the late 1990s. The only exception is that the dividend 
to asset ratio is significant, but the coefficient has a negative sign.  
 
Conclusions and recommendations for additional research 
The purpose of this paper was to assess whether or not institutional investors prefer the 
stocks of lodging corporations or the stocks of lodging REITs. We hypothesized that there would 
be differences in their preferences, primarily due to the dividend payment policies of the two 
types of firms. We find that institutional investors tend to prefer hotel REITs. We also find that 
there are significant differences between hotel corporations and hotel REITs in terms of size, 
book-to-market value ratios, capital expenditures, price and dividend payout ratios. Insurance 
firms have significant relation with excess returns, but other institutes do not have significant 
relation. 
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We then examine the preferences of institutional investors by individual investor type. We 
first examine all institutional investors together as a group and then subdivide the sample 
between banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, brokerage firms and pension funds. Most of 
the institutions have similar preferences with the variables of interest with the exception of 
pension funds. Most institutional holdings are negatively related to the book-to-market ratio; 
pension funds have a significant and positive relationship. A similar instance is the finding that 
most institutional holdings have a positive relationship with a firm’s capital expenditure to 
assets, while pension funds prefer firms with smaller ratios of capital expenditure.  The final 
difference is in regard to dividend payment policies. Mutual funds prefer high dividend-paying 
firms while pension funds are the opposite. 
We also ran additional regression models for all institutions since 1980 delineated into 5-
year time periods. The most interesting findings involved the debt and dividend-to-asset ratios. 
These two ratios changed significance and the signs of the coefficients dependent upon the time 
period of interest. As previously discussed, this may be as a result of legislation enacted during 
the past that affected lending practices or specific institutions. Further investigation as to the 
potential factors influencing institutional investor behavior during specific time periods could 
prove fruitful.  
Our findings that show differences in investment behavior between mutual funds and 
pension funds may be because of the prudent man rule. This is another topic that warrants further 
investigation. This is particularly true since investment in the hospitality industry by pension 
funds have increased dramatically since the 1990s. There also has been only a limited amount of 
research conducted into the area of hotel REIT risk and performance. It would be interesting to 
further investigate the investment and finance strategy of hotel REITs and non-REITs. 
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Table 1. Lodging REITs 
 
 
REIT name  * Type Exchange Ticker 
Ashford Hospitality Trust E AHT 
Boykin Lodging Company E Boy 
DiamondRock Hospitality Company E DRH 
Eagle Hospitality Properties Corporation E EHP 
Equity Inns, Inc. E ENN 
FelCor Lodging Trust Incorporated E FCH 
Hersha Hospitality Trust E HT 
Highland Hospitality Corporation E HIH 
Hospitality Properties Trust E HPT 
Host Marriott Corporation E HMT 
Innkeepers USA Trust E KPA 
Jameson Inns, Inc. E JAMS 
La Quinta Properties, Inc. E LQI 
LaSalle Hotel Properties E LHO 
MeriStar Hospitality Corporation E MHX 
MHI Hospitality Corporation E MDH 
PMC Commercial Trust H PCC 
RFS Hotel Investors, Inc. E RFS 
Strategic Hotel Capital, Inc E SLH 
Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc. E SHO 
Supertel Hospitality, Inc. E SPPR 
Winstone Hotels E WXH 
* E= equity trust, H = hybrid trust 
16 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and t-tests for the means of REIT and non-REIT lodging 
companies 
 
Panel A 
 Non-REIT REIT 
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D t-stat p-value 
Institutional holding 6690 0.06 0.13 2764 0.09 0.14 -7.37 0.00 
Log of institutional 
holding 
4593 -3.69 2.15 2469 -3.50 1.85 -3.87 0.00 
Size  4741 6.10 2.14 2315 5.59 1.25 12.46 0.00 
BVA/MVA 4172 0.88 0.38 2271 1.00 0.18 -15.98 0.00 
CAP EXP/AS 4850 0.08 0.10 2397 0.00 0.03 52.47 0.00 
DR 5094 0.43 0.52 2412 0.42 0.15 0.38 0.70 
Price 5046 23.41 22.95 2316 14.17 8.76 -24.93 0.00 
Dividend to assets 5089 0.02 0.24 2308 0.04 0.03 4.86 0.00 
Excess returns 4826 -0.03 0.12 2707 -0.03 0.09 0.62 0.53 
 
• Institutional holdings for a specific stock in the given quarter are determined by percentage of 
institutional ownership (the share holdings of all reporting institutions divided by the total shares 
outstanding for the firm). If a lodging firm in the Compustat database is not held by any institution, 
institutional holding of the firm becomes zero.   
• Size is the natural log of the market value of a firm’s equity.  
• BVA/MVA is the ratio of book value of asset to market value of asset.  
• CAP EXP/AS is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.  
• DR is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Institutional holdings are the ratio of the holdings of all 
reporting institutions to the outstanding shares for the firm.  
• Price is market price per share. 
• Dividend to assets is annual dividend divided to total assets. 
• Excess returns are actual returns minus risk-free rate. 
 
 
Panel B 
The first quartile of market capitalization 
 Non-REIT REIT 
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D t-stat p-value 
Institutional holding 1721 0.09 0.16 678 0.11 0.17 -2.28 0.02 
Log of institutional 
holding 
1721 -4.14 2.48 678 -3.64 2.07 -5.05 0.00 
Size  1347 5.24 2.04 631 4.99 1.69 2.88 0.00 
BVA/MVA 1202 1.06 0.38 589 0.95 0.16 8.59 0.00 
CAP EXP/AS 1217 0.10 0.11 622 0.00 0.01 32.16 0.00 
DR 1347 0.46 0.25 631 0.51 0.14 -5.76 0.00 
Price 1517 16.5 17.5 631 11.90 8.74 8.14 0.00 
Dividend to assets 1344 0.01 0.01 602 0.03 0.02 -24.55 0.00 
Excess returns 1362 -0.05 0.12 676 -0.05 0.08 0.01 0.99 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and t-tests for the means of REIT and non-REIT lodging 
companies 
 
Panel B, continued 
 
The second quartile of market capitalization  
 Non-REIT REIT 
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D t-stat p-value 
Institutional holding 1849 0.09 0.16 1514 0.10 0.15 -2.39 0.02 
Log of institutional 
holding 
1849 -4.04 2.40 1514 -3.43 1.85 -8.28 0.00 
Size  1482 5.50 1.72 1325 5.49 0.79 2.33 0.02 
BVA/MVA 1365 0.98 0.41 1292 0.99 0.17 -1.05 0.29 
CAP EXP/AS 1301 0.10 0.11 1325 0.00 0.00 32.54 0.00 
DR 1482 0.42 0.21 1325 0.44 0.12 -2.87 0.00 
Price 1642 17.5 16.7 1325 12.04 6.47 12.10 0.00 
Dividend to assets 1482 0.01 0.02 1305 0.04 0.02 -27.81 0.00 
Excess returns 1492 -0.02 0.14 1511 -0.03 0.08 2.80 0.01 
 
 
The third quartile of market capitalization 
 Non-REIT REIT 
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D t-stat p-value 
Institutional holding 2494 0.10 0.16 1115 0.13 0.18 -4.47 0.00 
Log of institutional 
holding 
2494 -3.89 2.29 1115 -3.14 1.68 -10.94 0.00 
Size  2023 6.18 1.49 955 6.26 0.80 -1.99 0.05 
BVA/MVA 1917 0.98 0.39 922 0.97 0.16 0.91 0.36 
CAP EXP/AS 1893 0.09 0.10 1065 0.00 0.01 37.97 0.00 
DR 2029 0.37 0.20 1065 0.42 0.15 -9.25 0.00 
Price 2223 20.00 15.60 955 15.74 8.16 10.14 0.00 
Dividend to assets 2029 0.01 0.06 935 0.03 0.02 -10.29 0.00 
Excess returns 2081 -0.03 0.11 1107 -0.02 0.09 -0.80 0.42 
 
 
The fourth quartile of market capitalization  
 Non-REIT REIT 
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D t-stat p-value 
Institutional holding 1356 0.10 0.18 436 0.14 0.20 -4.37 0.00 
Log of institutional 
holding 
1356 -4.12 2.49 436 -3.04 1.71 -10.16 0.00 
Size  988 5.85 2.05 386 6.04 1.14 -2.25 0.025 
BVA/MVA 979 1.08 0.40 353 0.91 0.12 11.47 0.00 
CAP EXP/AS 872 0.11 0.12 386 0.00 0.01 26.64 0.00 
DR 988 0.39 0.19 386 0.50 0.12 -12.86 0.00 
Price 1148 19.70 18.70 386 14.95 9.60 6.43 0.00 
Dividend to assets 988 0.00 0.01 366 0.02 0.01 -19.85 0.00 
Excess returns 1014 -0.03 0.11 433 -0.03 0.07 -0.19 0.85 
  
Table 3. Institutional Holdings by the time period and types of institutions 
 
 
    Bank   Insurance   Mutual Fund Brokerage Firms pension       
year Month 
# 
Shares 
& Dollars 
of shares shares 
Dollars of 
shares shares 
Dollars of 
shares shares 
Dollars of 
shares shares 
Dollars of 
shares 
total 
shares 
total 
dollar 
1980 12 14 500 1 42 1 41 9 262 4 140 30 985 
    46.43% 50.75% 4.03% 4.31% 4.33% 4.11% 30.10% 26.57% 15.11% 14.26%     
1981 12 16 532 3 92 2 60 9 262 4 126 34 1072 
    46.35% 49.59% 8.19% 8.62% 5.96% 5.62% 26.95% 24.41% 12.54% 11.75%     
1982 12 21 808 3 121 3 116 12 408 4 150 43 1603 
    48.07% 50.38% 7.27% 7.54% 8.02% 7.25% 27.37% 25.47% 9.27% 9.36%     
1983 12 17 838 5 236 5 173 19 846 4 201 50 2293 
    33.99% 36.53% 9.61% 10.29% 9.24% 7.56% 38.82% 36.87% 8.35% 8.74%     
1984 12 17 769 4 177 4 132 18 749 4 157 46 1984 
    35.88% 38.77% 7.87% 8.94% 8.84% 6.63% 39.47% 37.76% 7.95% 7.89%     
1985 12 13 613 4 203 4 168 22 1048 6 276 49 2307 
    27.37% 26.55% 7.32% 8.82% 8.20% 7.27% 45.60% 45.42% 11.51% 11.95%     
1986 12 16 693 14 305 4 156 31 1401 8 400 73 2955 
    22.04% 23.46% 19.04% 10.32% 5.56% 5.26% 42.95% 47.42% 10.42% 13.53%     
1987 12 15 475 14 240 8 238 42 1282 7 243 86 2478 
    17.58% 19.18% 16.58% 9.67% 9.63% 9.61% 48.64% 51.72% 7.56% 9.82%     
1988 12 21 602 5 188 7 198 49 1558 8 279 89 2824 
    23.54% 21.30% 5.32% 6.64% 7.78% 7.00% 54.73% 55.17% 8.63% 9.88%     
1989 12 21 763 6 201 7 251 42 1598 8 373 84 3186 
    24.94% 23.94% 7.45% 6.30% 7.77% 7.87% 49.75% 50.17% 10.08% 11.72%     
1990 12 5 123 3 59 4 9 14 320 9 71 35 582 
    15.90% 21.13% 7.94% 10.15% 10.92% 1.47% 40.26% 54.97% 24.97% 12.28%     
1991 12 6 168 2 84 4 75 19 487 9 72 40 885 
    14.37% 18.94% 6.05% 9.49% 10.46% 8.42% 47.70% 55.03% 21.42% 8.12%     
1992 12 9 187 3 83 5 141 28 778 5 103 50 1293 
    17.26% 14.44% 6.21% 6.46% 10.76% 10.91% 55.93% 60.20% 9.83% 7.99%     
1993 12 13 451 11 361 24 697 77 2295 5 194 131 3999 
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    9.88% 11.27% 8.69% 9.02% 18.35% 17.44% 58.98% 57.40% 4.09% 4.86%     
1994 12 42 2390 23 1016 42 1260 166 6003 13 692 286 11361 
    14.60% 21.04% 8.12% 8.94% 14.59% 11.09% 58.15% 52.84% 4.54% 6.09%     
1995 12 36 1191 60 2471 106 2853 194 6093 21 758 417 13366 
    8.71% 8.91% 14.41% 18.49% 25.31% 21.35% 46.45% 45.59% 5.13% 5.67%     
1996 12 70 2359 78 2343 218 6539 311 9039 34 1085 710 21365 
    9.82% 11.04% 10.97% 10.97% 30.71% 30.61% 43.76% 42.30% 4.74% 5.08%     
1997 12 73 3464 72 3057 224 9395 319 11364 41 2141 729 29422 
    10.02% 11.77% 9.86% 10.39% 30.69% 31.93% 43.74% 38.62% 5.69% 7.28%     
1998 12 56 1233 68 1214 0 0 274 5867 277 5361 676 13674 
    8.30% 9.01% 10.14% 8.88% 0.00% 0.00% 40.52% 42.90% 41.05% 39.20%     
1999 12 47 840 22 331 50 502 48 776 545 9622 711 12071 
    6.56% 6.96% 3.13% 2.74% 6.98% 4.15% 6.76% 6.43% 76.57% 79.71%     
2000 12 9 209 19 339 39 501 75 1762 615 14639 756 17450 
    1.17% 1.20% 2.47% 1.94% 5.13% 2.87% 9.88% 10.10% 81.36% 83.89%     
2001 12 77 1682 24 396 54 684 96 1746 883 15819 1134 20327 
    6.76% 8.27% 2.12% 1.95% 4.79% 3.36% 8.46% 8.59% 77.87% 77.83%     
2002 12 128 2032 16 180 53 602 105 1469 924 13796 1225 18078 
    10.46% 11.24% 1.29% 0.99% 4.32% 3.33% 8.56% 8.13% 75.37% 76.31%     
2003 12 171 3840 8 162 23 531 133 2559 1068 20221 1403 27313 
    12.19% 14.06% 0.60% 0.59% 1.63% 1.94% 9.48% 9.37% 76.10% 74.03%     
2004 12 193 5254 14 380 26 892 171 5112 1076 30634 1479 42271 
    13.03% 12.43% 0.95% 0.90% 1.73% 2.11% 11.56% 12.09% 72.74% 72.47%     
 
# shares: millions 
& dollars of shares: million 
 
  
Table 4. Correlation matrix with p-values 
 
 Log of 
institution 
holding 
Size Book-to-
market ratio 
Capital 
expenditure 
to asset 
Debt ratio price Dividend to 
assets 
Dummy REIT/ non 
REIT 
Size ***0.232 
 0.000 
       
Book-to-market ratio ***-0.143 
  0.000 
***-0.338 
  0.000 
      
Capital Expenditure 
to asset 
***0.085 
 0.000 
  0.001 
  0.923 
***-0.174 
  0.000 
     
Debt ratio ***0.037 
 0.002 
***-0.326 
  0.000 
*** 0.030 
  0.014 
 0.012 
 0.316 
    
Price ***0.202 
 0.000 
***0.666 
 0.000 
***-0.582 
  0.000 
*** 0.116 
  0.000 
***-0.280 
  0.000 
   
Dividend to assets ***0.043 
 0.000 
***0.038 
 0.001 
***-0.077 
  0.000 
*** -0.155 
  0.000 
*** 0.116 
  0.000 
*** 0.039 
  0.001 
  
Dummy REIT/ non 
REIT 
***0.033 
 0.004 
***-0.290 
  0.000 
***0.208 
  0.000 
*** -0.478 
  0.000 
*** 0.039 
  0.001 
*** -0.308 
  0.000 
*** 0.184 
  0.000 
 
Excess return  0.016 
 0.16 
***0.083               
0.000 
***-0.125 
  0.000 
*** -0.036 
  0.003 
** -0.023 
 0.053 
*** 0.08 
  0.000 
***-0.041 
  0.001 
-0.007 
0.566 
 
• Institutional holdings for a specific stock in the given quarter are determined by percentage of institutional ownership (the share holdings of all reporting 
institutions divided by the total shares outstanding for the firm). If a lodging firm in the Compustat database is not held by any institution, institutional 
holding of the firm becomes zero.   
• Size is the natural log of market value of a firm’s equity.  
• Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of asset to market value of asset.  
• Capital expenditure to asset is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.  
• Debt ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Institutional holdings are the ratio of the holdings of all reporting institutions to the outstanding shares for 
the firm.  
• Price is price per share. 
• Dividend to assets is annual dividend divided to total assets. 
• Dummy REIT/ non REIT: 1= REIT 0=non-REIT 
• Excess returns are actual returns minus risk-free rate.
  
Table 5. Regression analysis results of dividend policy on institutional holdings 
Dependent variable is log of institutional holding percentage. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
explanatory variables All Institutions Bank Insurance Mutual fund Brokerage Pension Fund 
number of observations 5920  1315  1097  1035  1296  1177   
R-square 8.4%  31.4%  20.7%  14.7%  17.6%  29.4%   
R-square adjusted 8.3%  31.0%  20.2%  14.0%  17.1%  28.9%   
                          
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -6.40 0.00 -7.54 0.00 -7.63 0.00 -4.34 0.00 -4.79 0.00 -8.09 0.00 
size  0.33 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.27 0.00 -0.00 0.96 0.24 0.00 0.70 0.00 
book-to-market ratio -0.20 -1.79 -0.21 0.20 -1.03 0.00 -1.06 0.00 -0.78 0.00 1.56 0.00 
capital expenditure to assets 2.88 0.43 3.48 0.00 9.53 0.00 4.03 0.00 3.35 0.00 -6.00 0.00 
debt ratio 1.07 0.00 0.48 0.04 2.35 0.00 0.65 0.04 0.94 0.00 1.21 0.00 
Price 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -1.02 0.00 
dividend to asset 0.33 0.52 -0.36 0.66 2.96 0.01 6.52 0.00 2.08 0.02 -9.75 0.00 
Dummy REIT/non-REIT 0.64 0.00 0.86 0.00 1.01 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.42 0.00 
Excess returns -0.11 0.65 -0.42 0.25 -1.59 0.00 0.09 0.86 0.45 0.27 0.79 0.11 
*, **, ***: significant at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
• Institutional holdings for a specific stock in the given quarter are determined by percentage of institutional ownership (the share holdings of all reporting 
institutions divided by the total shares outstanding for the firm). If a lodging firm in the Compustat database is not held by any institution, institutional 
holding of the firm becomes zero.   
• Size is the natural log of market value of a firm’s equity.  
• Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of asset to market value of asset.  
• Capital expenditure to assets is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.  
• Debt ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Institutional holdings are the ratio of the holdings of all reporting institutions to the outstanding shares for 
the firm.  
• Price is price per share. 
• Dividend to asset is annual dividend divided to total assets. 
• Dummy REIT/ non REIT: 1= REIT 0=non-REIT. 
• Excess returns are actual returns minus risk-free rates. 
 
  
Table 6. Regression analysis results of dividend policy on institutional holdings by the time period 
 
Dependent variable is log of institutional holding percentage. 
 All periods #1980-1985 #1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 
explanatory variables All Institutions All Institutions All Institutions All Institutions All Institutions All Institutions 
number of observations 5920  292  363  546  1959  2166  
R-square 8.4%  21.3%  35.2%  26.4%  9.4%  9.6%  
R-square adjusted 8.3%  19.4%  34.0%  25.3%  9.0%  9.2%  
                          
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -6.40 0.00 -3.54 0.00 -8.26 0.00 -3.46 0.00 -6.05 0.00 -6.53 0.00 
size  0.33 0.00 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.01 -0.43 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.47 0.00 
book-to-market ratio -0.20 0.07 -0.41 0.51 0.61 0.22 -0.88 0.02 -0.51 0.00 -0.04 0.88 
capital expenditure to assets 2.89 0.00 -0.07 0.96 2.73 0.06 9.41 0.00 3.35 0.00 -9.48 0.00 
debt ratio 1.07 0.00 -1.67 0.03 2.38 0.00 0.38 0.51 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.23 
Price 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.55 
dividend to asset 0.33 0.52 -16.02 0.09 -1.19 0.09 32.49 0.00 2.61 0.01 -16.68 0.00 
Dummy REIT/non-REIT 0.63 0.00     -0.75 0.01 0.52 0.00 0.67 0.00 
Excess returns -0.11 0.65 0.61 0.55 2.17 0.01 -0.72 0.25 0.13 0.79 -0.41 0.26 
• *, **, ***: significant at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
• # : All the hospitality firms are non-REIT firms. 
• Institutional holdings for a specific stock in the given quarter are determined by percentage of institutional ownership (the share holdings of all reporting 
institutions divided by the total shares outstanding for the firm). If a lodging firm in the Compustat database is not held by any institution, institutional 
holding of the firm becomes zero.   
• Size is the natural log of market value of a firm’s equity.  
• Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of asset to market value of asset.  
• Capital expenditure to assets is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.  
• Debt ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Institutional holdings are the ratio of the holdings of all reporting institutions to the outstanding shares for 
the firm.  
• Price is price per share. 
• Dividend to asset is annual dividend divided to total assets. 
• Dummy REIT/ non REIT: 1= REIT 0=non-REIT. 
• Excess returns are actual returns minus risk-free rates. 
